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his “knowledge essays”1 were my first “discoveries” of Austrian 
economics, prompted by the writings (on Keynes!) of Axel Leijon-
hufvud (1968). Hayek’s works have continued to influence me, so 
it is only appropriate, therefore, to pay homage to him. Specifically, 
I shall pay homage by addressing a favorite Hayek topic—namely 
that of capital theory. 
As we all know, much of Hayek’s early work concerned capital 
theory—either directly or more indirectly, as in his elaboration 
of Austrian business cycle theory.2 In fact, I would propose, as a 
conjecture in doctrinal history, that capital theory is the foundation 
of virtually all of his work in economics. This is obviously the case 
for what was intended to be the first volume of Hayek’s projected 
but unfinished magnum opus, namely the Pure Theory of Capital3 as 
well as Hayek’s many other writings on capital theory. However, 
I have argued myself in an old paper (1996) that capital theory 
played an important role in prompting Hayek’s thinking about the 
challenge to economic theory represented by dispersed knowledge. 
roughly, the argument in that paper is that the knowledge-based 
challenges of intertemporal coordination of a structure of hetero-
geneous capital—which, as roger Garrison has continuously 
reminded us,4 is the essence of Austrian business cycle theory—led 
Hayek to think about the role of knowledge in economic affairs.5 
There is obviously a link from the early knowledge essays to his 
later work on political philosophy and cultural evolution,6 but it 
all arguably begins with capital theory.
Capital theory relates to other key parts of Austrian economics. 
There is thus an obvious relation between heterogeneous capital 
and the Misesian calculation problem. Mises was—for all we 
know—not led to the discovery of this problem by noting the 
presence of heterogeneous capital in the economy per se. In fact, 
even if capital were homogenous, there would still be calculation 
1 Hayek (1937, 1945).
2 Hayek (1931).
3 Hayek (1941).
4 See, e.g., Garrison (1985, 2001).
5 Hayek (1937, 1945).
6 See, e.g., Hayek (1973).
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problems left (how much homogenous capital to devote to 
production now versus later), although considerably more trivial 
ones than if capital is heterogeneous. 
And yet, to Mises, the entrepreneur and heterogeneous capital 
goods are complementary phenomena. As he says, “the various 
complementary factors of production cannot come together spon-
taneously. They need to be combined by the purposive efforts of 
men aiming at certain ends and motivated by the urge to improve 
their state of satisfaction.”7 Lachmann echoes this, stating that  “…
the entrepreneur’s function… is to specify and make decisions on 
the concrete form the capital resources shall have. He specifies 
and modifies the layout of his plant.… As long as we disregard 
the heterogeneity of capital, the true function of the entrepreneur 
must also remain hidden.”8
These examples may suffice to indicate that capital theory is a 
fundamental—in the sense of “foundational” and “indispensable”—
part of the Austrian economics, on par with subjectivism, dispersed 
knowledge, and entrepreneurial appraisement, and that it is, 
in fact, intricately woven together with these themes. Thus, the 
implications of capital heterogeneity go much beyond the Austrian 
theory of the business cycle.
My sense is that Austrians certainly know that they stand apart 
on the issue of capital theory. Indeed, insisting that there is such a 
thing as “capital theory,” which may go beyond corporate finance 
and the theory of investment behavior, is a bit of an oddity in 
contemporary economics, as Garrison (1985) has noted. However, 
surprisingly Austrian capital theory is also a bit of an oddity in 
contemporary Austrian economics. To loosely illustrate, out of the 
197 articles published in the Review of Austrian Economics from 2002 
to 2011 (both years included), only 11 dealt directly with capital 
theory. The Quarterly Journal of Austrian Economics is doing only 
slightly better, with 189 articles in the same period, of which 15 
dealt directly with capital theory. 
One may fear that this reflects a belief, even among Austrians, 
that Austrian capital theory “lost” the historical debate; that the 
7 Mises (1998 [1949]), p. 249.
8 Lachmann (1978 [1956]), p. 16.
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Cambridge capital controversies proved that it’s all a big mess; 
that Sraffa and Knight proved that Austrian capital theory was full 
of internal contradictions, etc. 
Whatever that may be, I want in this talk to argue that Austrian 
capital theory should make something of a comeback as a quite 
central item on the Austrian agenda. In arguing this I am also 
wearing my management scholar’s hat: It should make a comeback 
as essentially a part of the theory of production—that is the theory 
of the economic process of converting inputs into outputs—rather 
than part of the theory of distribution or the theory of interest. As 
a part of the theory of production, the Austrian theory of capital 
stresses the heterogeneous nature of capital assets, the subjective 
nature of capital as part of the entrepreneur’s plans, and the time-
dimension of production. 
Thus understood, the Austrian theory of capital has opportunities 
for theoretical development that we have not yet fully explored. I 
shall examine such opportunities in the context of business firms, 
drawing on work with Peter Klein,9 among others.10 And I shall 
argue that this in turn provides an important underpinning for our 
understanding of the sources of economic growth. 
Hence, my title: Austrian ideas on heterogeneity represent an 
important challenge to homogenizing assumptions in management 
and economics. However, these ideas not only challenge, but can 
also constructively further existing thinking on firms and the growth 
process, potentially establishing Austrian economics as a highly 
relevant voice in contemporary discourse on these phenomena. 
AUSTRIAN CAPITAL THEORY AND SHMOO CAPITAL
In his treatise on ACT, Capital Theory in Disequilibrium, Peter Lewin 
notes that “Austrian capital theory has become synonymous in the 
literature with Böhm-Bawerkian capital theory.”11 Capital theory 
is often associated with questions, such as: “Is capital a fund? 
What is the nature of the earning of capital? What determines 
9 See, e.g., Foss and Klein (2012).
10 See, e.g., Agarwal et al. (2009), Bjørnskov and Foss (2013).
11 Lewin (1999), p. 71.
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these earnings?” and so on. One of the latest restatements and 
refinements of ACT, namely Rothbard’s in Man, Economy, and State, 
deals with these questions as well. 
Such questions are conceptual, distributional, and are often 
couched in a macro language. At least Böhm-Bawerk of Capital 
and Interest (1883) and Hayek of Prices and Production (1931) often 
give impressions of a strong leaning to the macro side. Of course, 
Böhm-Bawerk’s concentric circles and Hayek’s triangles imply 
capital heterogeneity of the capital goods (at least between stages of 
production; little is said of within-stages heterogeneity). However, 
notions of the “average period of production” (Böhm-Bawerk) or 
the “total value of flow capital” (Hayek) are macro notions. These 
are pretty much the notions that are still associated in the mind of 
mainstream economists (i.e., those few who have heard of ACT!) 
with ACT.12
There is a danger that such macro concepts direct attention away 
from something very basic and very important: The fundamental 
heterogeneity of capital. It seems to me that this is a theme that 
became increasingly important in Austrian thinking on capital 
from about the mid-thirties. 
I conjecture that the Austrian business cycle theory played a 
role here: In Böhm-Bawerk’s stationary state, the specificities 
and complementarities between capital goods are easily missed, 
because all productive operations proceed smoothly (as they must 
in a stationary state). The down-turn of the business cycle, on the 
other hand, is very much about capital goods that simply cannot be 
profitably deployed in other uses for which they are not fit. “Work 
on the new Cunarders will be suspended,” as Dennis robertson 
(1934, p. 653) put it in his variation of ABCT. Heterogeneity is 
brought starkly into relief by the downturn of the cycle. 
Not surprisingly, we therefore seem witness, from about the 
mid-1930s, an increasing interest among Austrians in the hetero-
geneity property of capital. richard von Strigl’s Kapital und Produktion 
(1934) is a good example. So are Lachmann’s Capital and Its Structure 
(1956), and Kirzner’s neglected An Essay on Capital (1966). Peter 
Lewin has done important contemporary work in this vein (e.g., 
12 E.g., Mark Blaug’s Economic Theory in Retrospect (1985), ch. 12.
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Capital in Disequilibrium, 1999). The key notion here is the funda-
mentally Mengerian one that capital goods are “essentially forward-
looking components of multi-period plans.”13 As Mises argued, this 
conceptualization in itself invalidates aggregation of capital goods: 
”the totality of the produced factors of production is merely an 
enumeration of physical quantities of thousands and thousands of 
various goods. Such an inventory is of no use to acting.”14
This emphasis seems to me to move the theory of capital 
somewhat away from its traditional distributional concerns 
and concerns with interest theory, and move it more towards 
the theory of production. But, it is a special kind of theory of 
production. ACT has often been compared to classical economics. 
Hicks (1973) famously made the argument that the Austrians and 
the classicists shared the same emphasis on capital as a fund (in 
the process lumping Böhm-Bawerk and Hayek together with 
Clark and Knight!15 Now, the classical theory of capital is a part 
of the theory of distribution. The classical theory of production, 
however, is a theory of the progressive division of labor. The 
Austrian emphasis on heterogeneous capital aligns closely with 
the latter aspect of classical economics, as Allyn Young (1928) 
suggested. Both involve time and heterogeneity and, therefore, 
the need for coordination. Both the classical theory and Austrian 
theory of production are—therefore—sharply opposed to the 
way production is portrayed in modern economics, namely the 
“production function view.” 
Here is how Axel Leijonhufvud (1986, pp. 203–204, 209) char-
acterized this view: the “neoclassical constant-returns production 
function,” he says, 
does not describe production as a process, i.e., as an ordered sequence 
of operations. It is more like a recipe for bouillabaisse where all the 
ingredients are dumped in a pot, (K, L), heated up, f(•), and the output, 
X, is ready. This abstraction from the sequencing of tasks… is largely 
responsible for the well-known fact that neoclassical production theory 
gives us no clue to how production is actually organized…  
13 Kirzner (1976), p. 135; see also Garrison (1990).
14 Mises (1998 [1949]), p. 263.
15 See Kirzner’s (1976) critical discussion of this.
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Smith’s division of labor—the core of his theory of production—slips 
through modern production theory as a ghostly technological change 
coefficient or as an equally ill-understood economies-of-scale property 
of the function.
What is the view of capital in the neoclassical production function 
view? In principle, as a purely mathematical approach, this view 
may seem capable of handling both heterogeneity and time. In 
actuality, it doesn’t handle either. This is best seen in modern math-
ematical macroeconomic models. Of course, mainstream macro-
economic models, given their focus on economy-wide phenomena 
(e.g., gross domestic or national product, employment, growth 
rates, etc.) tend to focus on aggregates, that is, industries, sectors, 
and entire economies. Aggregation, in turn, per definition leads to 
some kind of homogenization—as a minimum that there is some 
shared unit that the relevant items can be measured in terms of. 
Often, however, the assumption is made that everything included 
in the aggregate is homogenous. 
Thus, “labor” means homogeneous labor inputs; “capital” has 
the same interpretation. Paul Samuelson adopted the imagery of 
“shmoo” from the comic Lil’ Abner—shmoos are identical creatures 
shaped like bowling pins with legs—to capture this kind of homo-
geneity. This type of reasoning originated with David ricardo 
(1817)16 who found it a useful simplification. And it can be. But 
sometimes—perhaps usually—economists’ assumption of homo-
geneity sacrifices explanatory scope on the altar of the “tractability” 
beloved by formalist mainstream economists. In the following, I 
offer a few examples of how taking heterogeneity seriously matters. 
I will move from macroeconomics and macro policy down to the 
level of firms and then up again to the level of growth. 
CAPITAL HETEROGENEITY AND THE CURRENT 
MACROECONOMICS ORGY17
The Austrian perspective on heterogeneity has mostly been 
lost in contemporary macroeconomic discussions. As Kenneth 
16 Lachmann (1969).
17 This section borrows from Agarwal, Barney, Foss and Klein (2009).
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Boulding, reviewing Paul Samuelson’s Foundations of Economic 
Analysis, perceptively wrote in 1948: 
[I]t is a question of acute importance for economics as to why the macro-
economics predictions of the mathematical economists have been on the 
whole less successful than the hunches of the mathematically unwashed. 
The answer seems to be that when we write, for instance, “let i, Y, and 
I stand, respectively, for the interest rate, income, and investment,” we 
stand committed to the assumption that the internal structures of these 
aggregates or averages are not important for the problem in hand. In fact, 
of course, they may be very important, and no amount of subsequent 
mathematical analysis of the variables can overcome the fatal defect of 
their heterogeneity.
Most of the discussion surrounding the stimulus packages in uS 
and Europe has occurred at a very high level of aggregation. Despite 
the highly publicized failures of particular financial institutions, 
such as AIG, Lehman Brothers, Freddie Mac, and Fannie Mae, 
government officials spoke in terms of “the banking system,” “the 
financial system,” and the economy as a whole. Treasury Secretary 
Henry Paulson told Congress in September 2008 that radical steps 
were needed “to avoid a continuing series of financial institution 
failures and frozen credit markets that threaten American families’ 
financial well-being, the viability of businesses both small and 
large, and the very health of our economy.”18 The discussion of 
“frozen credit markets” focused on high-level indicators, with 
the focus on total lending, not the composition of lending among 
individuals, firms, and industries. The Federal Reserve System’s 
actions, noted Chairman Ben Bernanke, were needed to “increase 
liquidity and stabilize markets.”19
However, a decline in average home prices, reductions in total 
lending, and volatility in asset price indexes does not reveal much 
about the prices of particular homes, the cost of capital for specific 
borrowers, and the prices of individual assets. In analyzing the 
credit crisis, the critical question is which loans aren’t being made, 
to whom, and why? Indeed, it is impossible to understand the 
origins of the credit crisis without looking at the lending practices 
18 Paulson (2008).
19 Bernanke (2008).
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of government-sponsored enterprises like Freddie Mac and Fannie 
Mae and policies that encouraged lenders to lower underwriting 
standards, on the assumption that all borrowers were “really” 
equally credit-worthy.20 Assumptions about homogeneity—during 
a period of rapid central-bank credit expansion—is at the root of 
the financial crisis. 
In short, the critical issues here are the composition of lending, 
not the amount. Total lending, total liquidity, average equity 
prices, and the like obscure the key questions about how resources 
are being allocated across sectors, firms, and individuals, whether 
bad investments are being liquidated, and so on. Such aggregate 
notions homogenize—and in doing so, suppress critical infor-
mation about relative prices. The main function of capital markets, 
after all, is not to moderate the total amount of financial capital, 
but to allocate capital across activities. 
More generally, the uS stimulus package, and similar proposals 
around the world, are characterized by Keynesian-style reliance on 
macroeconomic aggregates. According to the common wisdom, the 
bank crisis led to a collapse of effective aggregate demand, and only 
massive increases in government expenditure (and government 
debt) can kick-start the economy. However, in a world of hetero-
geneous capital resources, spending on some assets but not others 
alters the pattern of resource allocation, and, in a path-dependent 
process, the overall performance of the economy in the future. In 
such a world, capital assets just cannot be shifted costlessly from 
one activity to another, particularly in a modern economy in which 
many of those resources are embodied in industry-specific, firm-
specific, and worker-specific capabilities. 
CAPITAL HETEROGENEITY AND THE GROWTH PROCESS
Critique of conventional macroeconomics and macro policy is 
one of the uses of the Austrian emphasis on heterogeneity.21 That 
is a very worthwhile use. There are, however, also implications 
for the building of theory of the Austrian insistence on capital 
20 Liebowitz (2009).
21 Lachmann (1969).
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heterogeneity. Specifically, there are implications of the very point 
that capital assets just cannot be shifted costlessly from one activity 
to another. 
I argued earlier that we may think of the ACT as a theory of 
production. This implies that we should look to the firm level. 
Indeed, the idea that resources, firms, and industries are different 
from each other, that capital and labor are specialized for particular 
projects and activities, that people (human capital), etc. are 
distinct, is ubiquitous in the theory and practice of management, 
particularly strategic management: Austrian ideas on capital find 
a close parallel in management thinking of firms as bundles of 
heterogeneous resources, assets, and/or activities.
Peter Lewin has recently argued22 that Austrian capital theory 
may form the basis for a “capital-based theory of the firm.” Peter 
Klein and I have developed similar arguments in a string of papers 
and a book, Organizing Entrepreneurial Judgment (2012). 
To get an idea of the basic arguments, consider the world of 
Samuelsonian shmoo. In this word, individuals face few or no 
costs of searching for assets (e.g., the capabilities of potential 
take-over targets or suppliers) that may fit existing operations, no 
costs of ascertaining the inherent characteristics of assets, no costs 
of coordinating assets, and so on. Most of those very real problems 
of exchange and organization that economists put under the 
transaction cost rubric would evaporate in a world of homogenous 
capital assets. Per implication, the understanding of the sources of 
transaction costs in a market economy involves the understanding 
of capital heterogeneity and its implications. Conversely, it seems 
to me that a significant part of the problems of what Joseph 
Salerno (2008) calls “entrepreneurial appraisement” and indeed a 
significant part of the Misesian calculation problem itself involves 
transaction costs, as Peter Klein (1996) has argued. 
To some—namely, those who specialize in the economics of the 
firm and/or work in business schools—these ideas are inherently 
attractive. They matter a lot to me and to Peter Klein (2012). Many 
of you may, however, only be interested in such ideas to the extent 
that they have economy-wide implications. So, do they? In fact, 
22 Lewin and Baetjer (2011).
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these firm-level ideas form an important micro-foundation for our 
reasoning about what happens at the economy-level.
For example, Matsusaka (2001) argues that processes of 
mergers and divestments should be understood as experimental 
learning processes that must be undertaken exactly because it is 
not obvious ex ante what are the efficient combinations of assets. 
These micro-level processes are essentially entrepreneurial ones, 
because an important part of the entrepreneur’s role is to arrange 
or organize heterogeneous resources. In Lachmann’s (1956, p. 16) 
words, “We are living in a world of unexpected change; hence 
capital [resource] combinations... will be ever changing, will be 
dissolved and reformed. In this activity, we find the real function 
of the entrepreneur.” 
On the aggregate level, these processes make the economy tracking 
its (moving) production possibility frontier, improving the efficiency 
with which resources are utilized. For example, Foster, Haltiwanger, 
and Krizan (1998) estimate that competitive dynamics through 
reallocation of productive assets account for about 50 percent of 
aggregate productivity growth. Moreover, hampering the automatic 
restructuring of industries in developed countries has been shown 
to imply a penalty in terms of forgone growth.23
Hence, the constraints, incentives, opportunities, etc. faced by 
appraising entrepreneurs must ultimately enter as a crucial element 
in the understanding of economy-wide phenomena, not the least 
the sources of economic growth. 
Much of the understanding of the growth process in economics 
has essentially been based on models of accumulating Samuel-
sonian shmoo along equilibrium growth paths. Some applications 
of Austrian capital theory do allow for heterogeneity, but otherwise 
portray growth as a smooth process of accumulation of physical 
capital along an equilibrium growth path. Hicks (1967) interpreted 
the Austrian cycle theory as essentially a theory of how such an 
equilibrium growth path can be disturbed by government inter-
vention. (According to Hicks, the essence of the “Hayek Story” was 
that noone really understood that Hayek was fundamentally talking 
about growth). He himself built a formal semi-Austrian model of 
23 Audretsch, Carree, van Stel, and roy (2003).
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equilibrium growth.24 roger Garrison’s (2001) treatment of growth 
in Time and Money also seems to model growth in terms of accumu-
lation of physical capital along an equilibrium growth path. 
However, there are also those who have argued that the growth 
process is driven by improvements in total factor productivity. The 
latter is an umbrella term for a host of highly diverse processes 
that to a large extent take place at the firm level. Thus, it has long 
been recognized that total factor productivity is about much more 
than “technology,” understood as recipe-like advances in scientific 
knowledge. Since the initial identification of the “unexplained” 
causes of growth in Solow’s (1956) work, significant attention has 
been devoted to randD as a driver of growth.25 However, randD 
itself does not drive total factor productivity; innovations that 
emerge from randD do.26 In turn, innovations are introduced by 
enterprising individuals. In addition, innovations have many other 
sources than the randD function, and they include process inno-
vations and innovations of management and organization. Funda-
mentally, these processes are entrepreneurial ones: they amount to 
appraising, combining and recombining27 heterogeneous assets in 
the uncertain pursuit of profitable opportunities. Their aggregate 
results are productivity advances and improvements in resource 
utilization, that is, increases in total factor productivity.  
Although it stands to reason that the “entrepreneur is the prime 
mover of progress,”28 it is only very recently that growth economists 
have explicitly begun to model and measure the entrepreneurial 
function. The reason lies exactly in the dominance of the production 
function framework in growth economics: If production factors are 
assumed to be homogenous within categories and production is 
always at the efficient frontier, there is simply very little to do for 
the entrepreneur. In actuality, capital is heterogeneous, and the 
combination of capital assets requires technical and commercial 
24 Hicks (1973).
25 See, e.g., romer (1990); Coe and Helpman (1995).
26 Acs et al. (2009).
27 Schumpeter (1911), rosenberg (1992).
28 Kirzner (1980).
163Nicolai J. Foss: The Continuing relevance of Austrian Capital Theory
processes that are in a sense experimental in nature.29 The optimum 
combination of inputs is not a datum, and what is at any moment 
the optimum combination will change as a result of changes in 
underlying scarcities. These processes are driven by the judgment 
of capitalist-entrepreneurs. In sum, entrepreneurship positively 
contributes to TFP. 
The influence of institutions on growth has been a big theme 
in the recent economics of growth, to such an extent that some 
scholars30 argue that “institutions rule”: institutional quality 
overwhelms all other determinants of growth. Now, a key reason 
to expect institutional quality to affect growth positively is that it 
entails decreased transaction costs through reduced uncertainty of 
economic transactions and productivity-enhancing incentives. As 
North (1990, p. 6) explains, “[t]he major role of institutions in a 
society is to reduce uncertainty by establishing a stable (but not 
necessarily efficient) structure to human interaction. The overall 
stability of an institutional framework makes complex exchange 
possible across both time and space.” In turn, higher certainty 
implies lower transaction costs, as the costs of entering into, 
bargaining, monitoring and protecting contractual and ownership 
rights are reduced.31 This increases the expected value of projects, 
and hence makes them more likely to be undertaken. 
In the recent surge of interest in the institutional determinants 
of growth, it is arguable that the micro-foundations of the link 
between institutions and growth have been somewhat neglected. 
As Wennekers and Thurik (1999, p. 27) suggest, more attention 
should be devoted to the
economic agents who link the institutions at the micro level to the economic 
outcome at the macro level. It remains veiled how exactly institutions and 
cultural factors frame the decisions of the millions of entrepreneurs and of 
entrepreneurial managers working with large companies.
So, the issue is: How do institutions and economic policies 
(including robert Higgs’ “regime uncertainty”; Higgs [1997]) 
29 Hayek (1968).
30 E.g., rodrik, Subramaniam, and Trebbi (2004).
31 Barzel (2005).
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drive total factor productivity? We know that increases in total 
factor productivity result from new processes, new modes of 
organization, ways of better allocating resources to preferred uses, 
and so on, that is, from processes involving start-ups as well as the 
entrepreneurship exercised by established firms. Given this, the 
flexibility (i.e., costliness) with which such changes can be carried 
out becomes highly important. 
In terms of production theory, this flexibility is captured by the 
notion of the elasticity of factor substitution,32 that is, the percentage 
change in factor proportions due to a change in marginal rate of 
technical substitution (e.g., in the extreme example of a Leontieff 
technology the elasticity is 0). The (aggregate) elasticity of substi-
tution is a measure of the flexibility of the economy, for example, 
with respect to reacting to external shocks.33 The aggregate elasticity 
of substitution is endogenous.34 Of course, Austrian capital theory 
suggests that there may be inherent technical constraints so that 
what Lachmann (1956) calls “multiple specificities” obtain. But, it 
also suggests that relations of complementarity and substitutability 
between capital goods have a strongly subjective dimension, being 
characteristics of entrepreneurial planning.35
This means that the elasticities of substitution are to a large 
extent endogenous to institutional variables, such as those that 
are sometimes called “freedom variables.” In turn, a high elas-
ticity of substitution implies high factor productivity, because it 
means that resources are more easily allocated to highly valued 
uses, new modes of organization and new processes are more 
easily implemented and so on. underlying the positive impact 
on factor productivity of a high elasticity of substitution is a high 
degree of certainty in dealings, and therefore low transaction costs 
of searching for contract partners, bargaining, monitoring and 
enforcing contracts. Huge literatures in economic history, on intel-
lectual property rights, and on innovation stress the importance 
for entrepreneurial activity of property rights being well-defined 
32 Klump and De La Grandville (2000).
33 Acquilina et al. (2006), p. 204.
34 Arrow et al. (1961).
35 Mises (1949), Kirzner (1966).
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and enforced.36 Well-defined and enforced property rights reduce 
the transaction costs of carrying out entrepreneurial activities, 
specifically, there will be low costs of searching for, negotiating 
with and concluding bargains with owners of those inputs that 
enter into entrepreneurial ventures. Well-defined and enforced 
income rights imply that the risk of undertaking entrepreneurial 
activities is reduced.
Similar reasoning applies to sound money. Inflation, and 
particularly erratic inflation, “jams” the signaling effects of 
relative prices, harming the process of allocating resources to 
their most highly valued uses, and therefore negatively impacts 
TFP. Moreover, erratic inflation makes it more risky to undertake 
long-term projects, and therefore may harm the incentives of those 
individuals who receive the residual income from such projects, 
that is, entrepreneurs. 
For many reasons the size of government influences total 
factor productivity. Most directly, if economic activities in certain 
industries or sectors have essentially been nationalized, the scope 
for entrepreneurship in those industries and sections is reduced, 
as nationalization often (but of course not necessarily) implies 
a public monopoly. In most parts of the Western industrialized 
world this is clearly the case of child care, health care, and care 
of the elderly. The effective nationalization of these industries 
means that the operation of the price mechanism becomes severely 
hampered,37 eliminating entrepreneurship and reducing the ability 
of the industries to effectively adapt to changing circumstances.  
To the extent that a large government is associated with high 
levels of publicly financed provision of various services (e.g., 
care of the elderly, education, etc.), with generous social security 
systems, and with high levels of taxation, the incentives to engage 
in entrepreneurship in order to make a living (what is often called 
“necessity entrepreneurship”) are reduced because a relatively 
high reservation wage is practically guaranteed and because entre-
preneurial incomes are heavily taxed. Such schemes also reduce 
incentives for individual wealth formation which may be expected 
36 See, e.g., North (1990), Glaeser et al. (2004), Mokyr (2006).
37 Mises (1949).
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to negatively influence the level of entrepreneurial activity.38 One 
reason has to do with entrepreneurial judgment being idiosyncratic 
and often hard to clearly communicate to potential investors.39 
The entrepreneur may have to finance his venture himself, at least 
in the start-up phase. If individual wealth formation is reduced 
because of generous public transfer schemes, etc., this makes such 
financing difficult. Moreover, if entrepreneurs are only able to 
commit small amounts of personal capital to their entrepreneurial 
venture, their signal to potential outside investors concerning their 
commitment to the venture is correspondingly weaker. 
Christian Bjørnskov and I (2013) argue that economic freedom, 
including the rule of law, easy regulations, low taxes and limited 
government interference in the economy, allows entrepreneurial 
experimentation with combining productive factors to take place in 
a low transaction costs manner. Such institutions of liberty thereby 
increase the aggregate elasticity of substitution, which translates 
into increasing total factor productivity, and, hence, growth. 
To assess these ideas empirically, we build a unique panel dataset 
consisting of 25 countries from 1980 to 2005, and test the influence 
of entrepreneurship and institutions on total factor productivity. 
We find that entrepreneurship strongly and significantly impacts 
TFP, and that some institutions of liberty as well as classical liberal 
economic policies promote growth in productivity and thus 
growth. Apart from the data, the novelty of the argument is that it 
explicitly relies on Austrian capital theory.
CODA
To sum up, I have made a plea for the continuing relevance of 
Austrian capital theory. Historically, ACT has been a central research 
area in Austrian economics. Substantively, it remains an integral 
part of Austrianism. It has had, however, a reputation of being a 
particularly difficult part of the body of Austrian theory. Perhaps for 
this reason, it is arguable that it has been one of the less researched 
areas in the last four decades’ revival of Austrian economics. It is time 
38 Henrekson (2005), p. 11.
39 Knight (1921).
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to change that. ACT has the potential to make interesting advances. 
I think there is a still a lot to do with respect to understanding the 
role of heterogeneous assets in entrepreneurial appraisal. There are 
many, fertile links to related thinking in management theory and 
other parts of economics, as I have argued. So, ACT can serve the 
strategic purpose for Austrians of extending their theorizing into 
new areas, while keeping intact the central core of Austrianism. To 
be sure, there is room in the Austrian tent for applied research on 
anarchism and pirates, telling mainstream economists how to do 
economics, integrating Austrian economics and complexity theory, 
and other trendy topics. However, the core of Austrian economics 
remains mundane topics like capital theory.40
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